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1. Introduction 
 
The question of whether the Russian economic space is single still keeps topicality. As Biyakov 
(2004) shows, there is no a uniform concept of the economic space and, all the more so, its unity. However, 
despite all differences in versions of the concept of ‘single economic space,’ it is obvious that it should be 
sure to imply the absence of barriers (except for ‘natural,’ geographically determined ones) to inter-regional 
trade, or, in other words, spatial integration of product markets. It may be said that spatial integration is the 
pivot of single economic space.  
The Moscow market keeps aloof in the system of Russian regions. As it is known, prices in Moscow 
are significantly higher than in the neighboring regions, even than those in the Moscow Oblast.1 Seemingly, 
this provides an excellent opportunity for profit earning through buying goods in regions where they are 
cheaper and selling them in Moscow. Goods arbitrage is a mechanism of the establishment and 
maintenance of spatial equilibrium that manifests itself in the law of one price. In its strict form, when 
transportation costs may be neglected (if they are very small as compared to the price of the good or the 
price includes average transportation costs), the law states that, in the absence of impediments to inter-
regional trade, the price of the same tradable good should be equal across all regions. (The tradable goods 
are those that can take part in inter-regional trade.) A weak version of the law takes account of ‘natural’ 
barriers to trade, allowing the price of the good to differ between two regions by no more than 
transportation costs (per unit of the good). But since prices in Moscow do not equalize with prices even in 
neighboring regions, this implies that there are considerable impediments to goods arbitrage in the Moscow 
market.2 
It is interesting to find out in this connection the position of the Moscow market in the economic 
space of Russia, i.e., to perform analysis of its integration with other country’s regions. Taking a market for 
an aggregated good, a minimum food basket (staples basket), time series of differences in the cost of the 
basket in Moscow and other regions over 2001–2015 are analyzed. The law of one price serves as a 
criterion of market integration. Regional markets are divided into four groups. The first group consists of 
regional markets that are integrated with the Moscow market, i.e., where the law of one price holds in the 
strict form. The second group includes markets that are conditionally integrated with the Moscow market, 
i.e., where the weak law of one price holds (the next section explains why integration is deemed conditional 
                                                           
1 It is worth noting that the Russian Statistical Agency, Rosstat, collects prices only in ordinary shops and markets, 
and not in ‘boutiques’ and other ‘elite’ outlets.   
2 The press provides a multitude of examples of such impediments: discriminatory policy of retail networks, policy of 
the Moscow government with respect to retail trade, activity of organized crime, etc. However, these are merely 
particular and odd examples; attempts to find a systematic study of features of the Moscow market for consumer 
goods in the literature have not met with success.  
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in this case). The third group is comprised of markets that are not integrated with the Moscow market but 
tending towards integration with it, i.e., where convergence of prices in Moscow and a given region takes 
place. Nonlinear time series models with asymptotically decaying trends describe the movement towards 
integration (price convergence). At last, the fourth group consists of markets that are neither integrated nor 
tending towards integration with the Moscow market.  
A number of papers investigate spatial pattern of market integration in Russia, using different 
product and location samples as well as time spans. Gardner and Brooks (1994) study market integration in 
Russia in 1992–1993, using data for six food commodities across 14 cities in the Volga economic area. 
They pool time series for all pairs of cities into a data panels (separately for each commodity). This allows 
including time invariant variables such as distance, price regulations, etc., but yields results averaged across 
city pairs, hence an overly aggregated pattern of market integration (so that its spatial dimension 
disappears). Berkowitz et al. (1998) analyze time series of prices for five foods across 13 to 25 cities from 
the European part of Russia in 1992–1995. They do not address directly to the issue of market integration, 
focusing on the relationship between the behavior of prices of similar goods across cities, which provides 
an indirect indications of integration. Goodwin et al. (1999) consider prices for four goods across five cities 
of Russia during 1993–1994, analyzing linkages of prices in each pair of cities with the use of 
cointegration, Granger causality, and impulse response techniques. They interpret the presence of the price 
linkages as evidence in favor of market integration. Gluschenko (2011) uses the cost of a staples basket 
relative to a benchmark region across almost all regions of Russia (represented by their capital cities) over 
1994–2000. Using time series analysis, regions are broken down into three groups: integrated with the 
benchmark region, tending towards integration with it, and neither integrated nor tending towards 
integration. Akhmedjonov and Lau (2012) deal with prices for four energy products in all Russian regions 
relative to the national average prices during 2003–2010. They focus on convergence of prices, applying a 
time series model with a nonlinear trend (the argument of which is the lag of the relative price rather than 
time). A similar methodology is used in Lau and Akhmedjonov (2012), where convergence of aggregated 
(relative) prices for outer clothing across 44 regions of Russia in 2002–2009 is explored.  
This paper contributes to the above literature, analyzing for the first time integration of the Moscow 
market with markets of other country’s regions (it is interesting to note that Moscow – along with a few 
other regions – is not infrequently excluded from the spatial sample in regional studies as an ‘outlier’). The 
main findings are as follows:  
– the Moscow market is very poorly integrated with markets of other regions (with a one fifth of 
them);   
– at the same time, a trend to the improvement of integration is observed: prices in approximately 
15% of the Russian regions converge with the Moscow prices. 
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2. Methodology 
 
Let prt and pst be prices for a tradable good in regions r and s, respectively, at time point t. The law of 
one price is formalized as prt/pst = 1 for all t = 0,…, T and a region pair (r, s). Describe Prst = ln(prt/pst) as 
the price differential (or price disparity, since Prst ≈ prt/pst – 1). Then the law of one price takes the form Prst 
= 0. In reality, if the law holds, prices in regions r and s coincide accurate to random shocks νt (to 
economize notation, the region indices for disturbances and model parameters are suppressed). It is 
reasonable to assume the prices, hence, their disparity, to depend on their previous values, i.e. to be 
autocorrelated. Then the econometric model of the law of one price is the autoregression model AR(1) Prst 
= νt,νt = (λ + 1)νt–1 + εt, where λ + 1 = ρ is the autoregression coefficient and εt is the Gaussian white noise. 
Substituting the second equation into the first one and denoting ΔPrst ≡ Prst – Prs,t–1, we get the canonical 
form of the AR(1) model with no constant (hereafter, t = 1,…,T): 
ΔPrst = λPrs,t–1 + εt.         (1) 
The law of one price holds if time series Prst is stationary (contains no unit root). In this case, markets 
of regions r and s are deemed perfectly integrated with each other. It is worth noting that integration of 
spatially separated markets does not necessarily implies that there are trade flows between them; it is the 
potential possibility of  unimpeded trade between these markets that is important. 
The presence of transportation costs in prices of the goods can result in time-invariant price disparity. 
A weak version of the law of one price in the form Prst = Crs describes this case (other versions are possible, 
e.g., C(–)rs ≤ Prst ≤ C(+)rs, which leads to a threshold autoregression model). Based on the same 
considerations as above, we get the AR(1) model with constant γ = –λCrs: 
ΔPrst = γ  + λPrs,t–1 + εt.         (2) 
The weak law of one price holds if time series Prst is stationary about a nonzero (statistically 
significant) constant. In this case, markets of regions r and s are deemed conditionally integrated with each 
other. Disparity Crs quantifies arbitrage transaction costs. However, in the framework of time series 
analysis, it is impossible to reveal the nature of Crs. They can, indeed, reflect transportation costs only, but 
it can also include also effects due to ‘artificial’ or eliminable (in principle) impediments to integration. The 
former includes regional protectionism, local price regulations, organized crime,3 etc. The latter is features 
of local markets that determine ‘nontradable component’ of retail prices. That is why the term ‘conditional 
integration’ is applied here: markets of regions r and s could be acknowledged as integrated on condition 
that the disparity is due to transportation costs only. 
The ‘nontradable component’ of prices is worth a more detailed consideration. It is the distribution 
                                                           
3 Gluschenko (2007) describes mechanisms of impact of organized crime on prices for consumer goods. 
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costs, the lion’s share of which being costs of nontradable services. In turn, their most significant parts are 
labor in trade and the lease of places of business and storage rooms. Computations based on data from 
Rosstat (2015, pp. 109, 116) suggest that the share of these costs in the distribution costs – averaged over 
the country and all consumer goods – was equal to 57% in 2014 (out of it, wages with deductions for the 
social insurance funds gave 35.8%, and rent gave 21.2%). Their proportion of retail prices was 13.7% (as 
the distribution costs made up 24.1% of the prices). In other words, the labor costs and rent increase retail 
price by 18.6%. Thus, prices in local markets for labor and real estate significantly influence on retail 
prices for goods in the region.  
If we would restrict our analysis to Models (1) and (2) only, we get a rather poor pattern that ignores 
transitional processes. Despite markets of regions r and s are not integrated with each other, either perfectly 
or conditionally, in the time span under consideration, the price disparity can diminish over time (i.e., price 
convergence takes place). An asymptotically decaying trend of price differential can describe such a 
process:   Prst = Crs(t),  Crs(t) → 0 as t → ∞, and sign(Crs(0))⋅dCrs(t)/dt < 0. Taking account of 
autocorrelation, we get an AR(1) model with a trend:  
ΔPrst = C(t) – (λ + 1)C(t – 1) + λPrs,t–1 + εt.       (3) 
Two types of trend are applied: exponential trend tetC δγ=)( , δ < 0, and fractional trend 
t
tC δ
γ
+= 1)( , δ > 0. The respective nonlinear models look like: 
ttrs
tt
rst PeeP ελγλγ δδ +++−=Δ −− 1,)1()1( ;       (3a) 
ttrsrst Ptt
P ελδ
γλδ
γ ++−++−+=Δ −1,)1(1)1(1 .       (3b) 
Price convergence takes place if time series Prst is stationary about the trend (one of them or both), γ 
и δ are statistically significant, and parameter δ  has the ‘correct’ sign. Then markets of regions r and s are 
deemed tending towards integration with each other. Incorrect sign of δ implies price divergence, hence the 
respective region pair is deemed non-integrated (and diverging). The rate of convergence towards 
integration (to the strict law of one price) can be characterized by half-life time θ , i.e., time needed for the 
price difference prt/pst – 1 to halve. For the exponential trend, it equals   
)))1(5.0ln(ln(1 γδθ
γ += e ; 
for the fractional trend, it equals 
)1
))1(5.0ln(
(1 −+= γ
γ
δθ e .  
Gluschenko (2011) uses a different trend function, log-exponential trend C(t) = log(1 + γeδt), δ < 0. 
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Its advantage is the ease of interpretation: γ is immediately the initial (at t = 0) difference in prices; the half-
life time depends only on δ, and in a simple way at that: θ = ln(0.5)/δ. However, the log-exponential trend 
has a crucial shortcoming of not obtaining symmetry properties with respect to permutation of region 
indices. That is, regressions of Prst and Psrt with this trend yield estimates of all parameters (λ,γ, and δ) that  
differ in absolute values, despite Psrt = –Prst. This can results in that model AR(1) with the log-exponential 
trend is accepted for Prst and rejected for Psrt (or vice versa), which contradicts common sense. (In this 
study, this would occur for the pair Moscow – Saint Petersburg.) Contrastingly, in models (3a) and (3b), 
permutation of region indices changes only the sign of γ,  keeping λ and δ (as well as all regression 
statistics) invariant.  
If no one of the above three models describes the behavior of prices in region pair (r, s), the markets 
of these regions are deemed neither integrated nor tending towards integration with each other (hereafter, 
simply non-integrated for brevity). 
Index s in what follows is fixed and corresponds to Moscow which is taken as a benchmark for 
comparison. Regressions (1), (2), (3a), and (3b) are estimated separately for each region r. The 10% 
significance level is accepted as a critical level for all parameters and unit root tests. If Models (3a) and 
(3b) turn out to be completive, the model providing the best fit – namely, the minimal sum of squared 
residuals – is accepted. 
The most important for these regressions is testing time series for stationarity, i.e. the hypothesis 
tested is whether time series Prst has a unit root, λ = 0 (against λ < 0). Its rejection implies that the time 
series is stationary, fluctuating around its long-run path. Intuitively this means that when a random shock 
makes the price differential to deviate from the long-run path, market forces return it (after a time) back. 
Otherwise, if the time series is non-stationary, no return occurs. The long-run path is the price parity, P* = 
0, in Model (1), and a time-invariant constant, P* = Crs, in Model (2). In the case of Models (3), the long-
run path is trend C(t).  
To test for a unit root, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and Plillips-Perron test are applied 
that take account of possible autocorrelation of a form other than AR(1). The unit root hypothesis is 
deemed rejected if both tests reject it. Different versions of these tests are possible. In this study, the 
following options are applied.  
To choose the optimal lag length in the auxiliary regressions of the ADF test, the lag length varies 
from 0 to Kmax = [12(T/100)1/4], where [x] stands for integer part of x, whereas the number of included 
observations remains constant and equals T – 1 – Kmax according to Ng and Perron (2005). A modified 
Bayesian information criterion put forward by Ng and Perron (2001) serves for choosing the optimal lag 
length in order to avoid size distortions that can be caused by ‘ordinary’ information criteria (as they tend 
to select lag lengths that are generally too small). Then the reestimation of the auxiliary regression with the 
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optimal lag length and actual number of observations yields the adjusted value of λ and, in turn, test 
statistic τ = λ/σλ,. Note that the auxiliary regression is purely technical: it is used only for obtaining 
adjusted value ofτ; the estimates of λ and other regression parameters are taken from the original 
regression.  
In contrast to the ADF test, the Phillips-Perron test adjusts values of σλ rather than λ. This test is 
known to suffer from size distortions. These may be avoided with the use of an autoregressive spectral 
density estimator instead of kernel-based estimators (Perron and Ng, 1996). Therefore, the OLS (not-
detrended) autoregressive spectral method is applied in this study. In doing so, the lag length selection 
method is the same as described above for the ADF test. 
The above methods are realizable by choosing respective options for the ADF and Phillips-Perron 
tests in the EViews package. These standard tools have been employed to test linear Models (1) and (2). 
For Models (3a) and (3b), nonlinear counterparts of the ADF and Phillips-Perron tests have been developed 
with similar testing procedures. To obtain distributions of the test statistics for the nonlinear models, τ-
statistics have been estimated for sample size T = 180 with the use of a sample of 1,000,000 random walks. 
Figure 1 plots the 10-percent tails of the distributions of these τ-statistics, comparing them with the Dickey-
Fuller distributions for the cases of linear and quadratic trends from MacKinnon (1996). Table 1 reports 
selected critical values of the τ-statistics. 
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Figure 1. Distributions of τ-statistics for models with nonlinear trends (T = 180) 
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Table 1. Critical values of the unit root test τ-statistics for models with nonlinear trends 
 
Significance 
level 
Exponential 
trend (3a) 
Fractional trend 
(3b) 
0.1% –4.463 –6.616 
1% –3.865 –5.162 
5% –3.279 –3.825 
10% –2.974 –3.302 
20% –2.614 –2.796 
 
 
Not infrequently, a time series Prst satisfies more than one model. Then the ‘most proper’ model is to 
be selected. Theoretically, one should proceed ‘from general to specific,’ that is, from the most general 
Model (3) to Model (2) and then to Model (1), accepting the first significant model in this sequence. 
However, the reverse sequence, ‘specific to general,’ seems more reasonable from the intuitive point of 
view. If a time series satisfies both Equations (1) and (2), it is reasonable to assume that although constant γ 
in Equation (2) is statistically significant, it is small and is caused by some accidental reasons (being a 
statistical artifact) rather than by properties of the process itself. Hence, it is logical to accept Model (1). 
Similarly, when a time series satisfies Equations (3a) or/and (3b) and (2) and/or (1), the reason may be a 
very weak trend, incidentally manifesting itself in the data. Hence, the model without trend should be 
accepted. Based on these considerations, the specific-to-general approach is applied in this study. 
 
3. Data 
 
In this study, by a region is meant a federal subject of Russia (among them, the federal cities of 
Moscow and Saint Petersburg). However, the composite federal subjects (that include or included 
autonomous okrugs, namely, the Arkhangelsk, Tyumen, and Irkutsk oblasts, and the Perm, Krasnoyarsk, 
Transbaikal and Kamchatka krais) are considered as single regions, jointly with autonomous okrugs. The 
spatial sample for the analysis covers 79 regions, all Russia’s regions but the Chechen Republic (as well as 
the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol), where full data on prices are lacking.  
A market for an aggregated good, the minimum food basket, is considered. This basket, also known 
as the staples basket, is used by the Russian Statistical Agency, Rosstat, since 2000. It includes 33 basic 
foods; quantities of the goods in the basket being uniform across regions and time. Rosstat (2014) reports 
the composition of the staples basket. The time series of the cost of the staples basket have a monthly 
frequency and cover January 2001 through December 2015 (180 time observations for each region). The 
price data are drawn from the Integrated Interagency Informational and Statistical System of Russia 
(EMISS), https://www.fedstat.ru/indicator/31481.do.  
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the cost of the staples basket in Moscow relative to the Russian 
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average (which is the weighted average over regions with weights being regions’ proportions of the national 
population). In the first three years of the time span under consideration, the relative cost of the basket in 
Moscow was almost 30% above the Russian average (its annual averages equaling 1.27–1.29). It started fast 
decreasing after that, reaching the annual average of 1.12. In other words, the cost of the basket rose in 2003–
2008 slower than in the country as a whole. During the next three years, it increased again and stabilized 
since 2012 at the level of circa 1.2 (the annual averages in 2012–2015 equaled 1.18–1.20).4 Thus, there is no 
an unambiguous trend in the evolution of the cost of the basket during the period under consideration: 
convergence of the Moscow prices with the Russian average changes to divergence and then to stabilization.  
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Figure 2. Cost of the minimum food basket in Moscow relative to the Russian average  
 
Figure 3 reports descriptive statistics of the data. It shows the dynamics of the cross-region mean of 
the price differential tP  and the standard deviations of the price differential, )( tPσ . The graph of 
tP suggests the evolution of the price disparity with respect to the Moscow prices. It leads to the same 
conclusion as the above scrutiny of the evolution of the basket cost in Moscow relative to the Russian 
average from Figure 2. The point is that this indicator and tP  have a similar meaning. Taking tP  with the 
reverse sign and rescaling it, their graphs become very close to each other.   
 
                                                           
4 No significant changes occurred in 2016 as well. The annual average of the cost of the basket increased by one 
percent point relative to the previous year.  
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Figure 3. Descriptive statistics of the price differential 
 
The standard deviations of the price differential, if fact, give an idea of dispersion of the cost of the 
basket in the country excluding Moscow. The evolution of price dispersion suggests the absence of both 
convergence and divergence of prices between the rest regions. Statistical testing reveals no any trend in 
)( tPσ . The standard deviation fluctuates about the value of 0.194. However, its volatility is fairly high: 
fluctuations range between –22% to +15%. This can be probably explained by uneven in time and 
asynchronous across regions inflation. On average, monthly inflation rate over 2001–2015 was 0.85% 
(10.7% per year), varying across regions from 0.71% to 0.96% (8.9% to 12.1% per year).  
 
4. Results 
 
Table 2 reports the results of the econometric analysis. It contains estimates of significant models 
only (that is, the models with all parameters being statistically significant and a unit root being rejected by 
both tests); recall that the specific-to-general approach is applied to select models. Appendix reports the full 
set of estimates of all four models.  
As the table suggests, integration of the Moscow market with the rest of Russia is very poor. It is 
integrated with markets of 16 regions (8 cases of perfect integration and 8 cases of conditional integration) 
out of 78, or only one fifth (20.6%). Along with this, there is a tendency to improvement in integration: 
prices in 12 regions of the country (15.4%) converge to the Moscow prices. Certainly, convergence of 
prices between some region and Moscow does not necessarily imply that it will eventually equalize prices. 
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Most probably, this process will result (beyond the time span under consideration) in stabilization of the 
price differential at some nonzero level, i.e. in conditional integration. The convergence rate varies greatly 
across regions: the half-life time ranges from 1.3 to 29.8 years.  In total, integration (perfect and 
conditional) with the Moscow market and price convergence occur in 28 regions (35.9%). Thus, almost two 
thirds of regional markets (64.1%) are neither integrated with the Moscow market nor moving towards 
integration with it. Among them, there is a case of price divergence: the behavior of the price differential 
between Moscow and the Magadan Oblast obeys the model with the exponential trend (3a) with a positive 
exponent.   
 
Table 2. Estimation and unit root test results 
 
Region Model λ  
Unit root test  
p-values 
(PP/ADF) 
γ  δ  
Half-life 
time, θ 
(years) 
  1. Rep. of Karelia (1) -0.020 (0.012) 0.100 /0.100      
  2. Rep. of Komi  (1) -0.031 (0.015) 0.035 /0.035      
  3. Arkhangelsk Obl. (1) -0.020 (0.011) 0.069 /0.069      
  4. Vologda Obl. none         
  5. Murmansk Obl. (1) -0.046 (0.023) 0.079 /0.091      
  6. St. Petersburg City none         
  7. Leningrad Obl. (1) -0.016 (0.009) 0.080 /0.080      
  8. Novgorod Obl. none         
  9. Pskov Obl (3a) -0.135 (0.035) 0.018 /0.050 -0.398*** (0.028) -0.0098*** (0.0010) 6.8 
10. Kaliningrad Obl. none         
11. Bryansk Obl. none         
12. Vladimir Obl. none         
13. Ivanovo Obl. (3a) -0.164 (0.041) 0.020 /0.052 -0.369*** (0.019) -0.0042*** (0.0006) 15.6 
14. Kaluga Obl. (2) -0.073 (0.028) 0.091 /0.091 -0.018*** (0.007)    
15. Kostroma Obl. none         
16. Moscow City Benchmark      
17. Moscow Obl. none         
18. Oryol Obl. none         
19. Ryazan Obl. none         
20. Smolensk Obl. none         
21. Tver Obl. none         
22. Tula Obl. none         
23. Yaroslavl Obl. none         
24. Rep. of Mariy El  none         
25. Rep. of Mordovia none         
26. Chuvash Rep.  none         
27. Kirov Obl. none         
28. Nizhni Novgorod Obl. none         
29. Belgorod Obl. none         
30. Voronezh Obl. none         
31. Kursk Obl. none         
32. Lipetsk Obl. none         
33. Tambov Obl. none         
34. Rep. of Kalmykia none         
35. Rep. of Tatarstan (3a) -0.218 (0.047) 0.016 /0.100 -0.411*** (0.014) -0.0023*** (0.0004) 29.3 
36. Astrakhan Obl. none         
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Region Model λ  
Unit root test  
p-values 
(PP/ADF) 
γ  δ  
Half-life 
time, θ 
(years) 
37. Volgograd Obl. none         
38. Penza Obl. none         
39. Samara Obl. (2) -0.107 (0.034) 0.042 /0.057 -0.017*** (0.006)    
40. Saratov Obl. (2) -0.063 (0.024) 0.092 /0.092 -0.021*** (0.008)     
41. Ulyanovsk Obl. (2) -0.076 (0.029) 0.086 /0.086 -0.024*** (0.009)    
42. Rep. of Adygeya none         
43. Rep. of Dagestan none         
44. Rep. of Ingushetia (2) -0.120 (0.035) 0.012 /0.012 -0.021*** (0.006)    
45. Kabardian-Balkar Rep. none         
46. Karachaev-Cirkassian Rep. none         
47. Rep. of Northern Ossetia none         
48. Krasnodar Krai (1) -0.012 (0.008) 0.003 /0.037      
49. Stavropol Krai none         
50. Rostov Obl. none         
51. Rep. of Bashkortostan (3b) -0.144 (0.037) 0.060 /0.067 -0.372*** (0.026) 0.0034*** (0.0010) 29.8 
52. Udmurt Rep. (2) -0.143 (0.039) 0.023 /0.059 -0.041*** (0.011)    
53. Kurgan Obl. (3b) -0.172 (0.039) 0.037 /0.050 -0.397*** (0.028) 0.0055*** (0.0013) 18.6 
54. Orenburg Obl. (2) -0.133 (0.036) 0.006 /0.006 -0.042*** (0.011)    
55. Perm Krai none         
56. Sverdlovsk Obl. (3b) -0.094 (0.017) 0.004 /0.022 -1.050*** (0.259) 0.0925*** (0.0285) 1.5 
57. Chelyabinsk Obl. (3b) -0.134 (0.036) 0.080 /0.081 -0.282*** (0.036)  0.0046** (0.0021) 20.7 
58. Rep. of Altai (3a) -0.274 (0.047) 0.000 /0.000 -0.334*** (0.023) -0.0088*** (0.0010) 7.4 
59. Altai Krai none         
60. Kemerovo Obl. (3b) -0.183 (0.042) 0.058 /0.097 -0.326*** (0.026)  0.0035*** (0.0012) 27.9 
61. Novosibirsk Obl. (3b) -0.127 (0.018) 0.000 /0.039 -1.333*** (0.287) 0.1233*** (0.0327) 1.3 
62. Omsk Obl. none         
63. Tomsk Obl. none         
64. Tyumen Obl. none         
65. Rep. of Buryatia none         
66. Rep. of Tuva none         
67. Rep. of Khakasia none         
68. Krasnoyarsk Krai none         
69. Irkutsk Obl. (3b) -0.157 (0.038) 0.080 /0.094 -0.227*** (0.061) 0.0160* (0.0091) 5.8 
70. Transbaikal Krai (3b) -0.207 (0.044) 0.017 /0.017 -0.254*** (0.054)  0.0213** (0.0092) 4.4 
71. Rep. of Sakha (Yakutia) none         
72. Jewish Autonomous Obl. (1) -0.033 (0.019) 0.070 /0.070      
73. Chukotka A.O. (2) -0.090 (0.032) 0.060 /0.060 0.074*** (0.027)    
74. Primorsky Krai none         
75. Khabarovsk Krai none         
76. Amur Obl. (1) -0.028 (0.015) 0.068 /0.068      
77. Kamchatka Krai none         
78. Magadan Obl. (3a) -0.108 (0.033) 0.054 /0.054 0.233*** (0.029) 0.0038*** (0.0010) none 
79. Sakhalin Obl. none         
Notes: 1. PP and ADF stand for the Phillips-Perron test and augmented Dickey-Fuller test, respectively; 2. Standard 
errors are in parentheses; 3. Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*); 4. ‘Obl.’ = Oblast, ‘Rep.’ = Republic, and 
‘A.O.’ = Autonomous Okrug.  
 
The use of the general-to-specific approach practically would not change the pattern. In doing so, as 
could be expected, the number of perfectly integrated markets decreases (to 5) in favor of conditionally 
integrated ones; in turn, the latter number diminishes (also to 5) in favor of regions moving towards 
integration (their number increases to 17). The total number of such regions diminishes by one (because of 
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the change of conditional integration in the Saratov Oblast to price divergence with a very weak trend).  
Consistency of results suggested by the ADF and Phillips-Perron tests is fairly high. The 
discrepancies take place in 23 regressions out of all 312, i.e., in 7.4%. In 20 regressions of the forms (3a) 
and (3b) as well as in one regression of the form (2), the Phillips-Perron test rejects the unit root 
hypothesis, while the ADF test does not. In two regressions of the form (1), the ADF test rejects this 
hypothesis and the Phillips-Perron test does not. It may be guessed that the ADF test has lower power in 
regressions with the nonlinear trend. However, the check of this guess would need a very effortful 
comparative study of the power properties of the ADF and Phillips-Perron tests in such regressions. If one 
would accept this guess to be true, for all that, and focus on the Phillips-Perron test only, the republics of 
Kalmykia, Dagestan, Northern Ossetia, and Tuva, Kabardian-Balkar Republic, Altai and 
Krasnoyarsk krays, and Tomsk Oblast enter additionally to the group of regions moving towards 
integration with the Moscow market, and the Tymen oblast enters to the group of conditionally 
integrated regions. Then the total number of regional markets integrated (perfectly or 
conditionally) with Moscow market and moving towards integration with it would rise to 37, that 
is, to 47.4% of the total number of regions.  
It should be noted that the applied methods of testing for stationarity reject unit roots under more 
rigorous conditions than methods in common use. If those (using the ‘ordinary’ Bayesian information 
criterion with no sample-dependent penalty factor in the ADF test and a kernel-based spectral 
estimator in the Phillips-Perron test) were applied, the pattern would be much more optimistic. While 
the number of perfectly integrated regions would remain the same, the number of conditionally integrated 
regions would increase to 18 and the number of regions moving towards integration with Moscow would 
increase to 19. The total number of such regions would reach 45 (57.7% out of all regions). The use of the 
general-to-specific approach would give the same number (with a different grouping of regions). However, 
according to Perron and Ng (1996) and Ng  and Perron (2001), such an ‘improvement’ of the pattern may 
be due to size distortions of the unit root test, hence, their lesser reliability.    
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Fig. 4. Geographical pattern of integration of the Moscow market with markets of other Russian regions.  
Notes: See Table 2 for numerical designations of regions. Not numbered region is the Chechen Republic. 
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Let us turn to the spatial pattern of integration of the Moscow market depicted in Figure 4. It looks 
very strange from the viewpoint of the economic geography. The Moscow market is not integrated with the 
markets of the nearby regions (except for conditionally integrated Kaluga Oblast, and the Ivanovo Oblast, 
where prices converge to the Moscow prices). The most surprising is the absence of integration with the 
surrounding Moscow Oblast. At the same time, there is perfect integration with the northern regions of the 
European part of Russia (and the Leningrad Oblast), although the Krasnodar Krai at the South is also 
perfectly integrated.5 Conditional integration is observed – in addition to the Kaluga Oblast – in a small 
cluster of regions to the East and South from Moscow (and in one region estranged from this cluster, the 
Republic of Ingushetia). Another, also small, cluster of regions abuts upon it, where convergence of prices 
to the Moscow ones occurs.  
As for the Asian part of Russia, there is a sole region that is conditionally integrated with the 
Moscow market, namely, the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (where the cost of the basket was 28% higher 
than in Moscow on average over the period under consideration). Markets of two Far Eastern regions (the 
Jewish Autonomous Oblast and Amur Oblast) prove to be perfectly integrated with the Moscow market. 
Besides, the movement towards integration with the Moscow market takes place in a small number of 
southern Siberian regions (as well as in one Far Eastern region). 
All this differs greatly from theoretically expected pattern. In a well-established market, such a 
pattern would look like, relatively speaking, as a system of concentric ‘circles’ with the center in the region 
under consideration, A. The first ‘circle’ consists of nearby regions, where costs of transportation between 
them and region A are small. Therefore, perfect integration between markets of these regions and region A 
is observed. The next ‘circle’ is comprised of more distant regions. Model (2) with a constant reflecting 
transportation costs describes integration with them. At last, the third ‘circle’ is made up of regions that are 
very distant from A, if there are such in a given country.6 Integration with these may be absent. A real 
pattern, of course, would deviate in a varying degree from the above one. Nonetheless, the former is 
usually similar in outline (albeit crudely) with the latter. 
Only a part of the pattern from Figure 4 that relates to the regions eastward from the Urals conforms 
to the theoretical pattern, if the following consideration is taken into account. Speaking of Russia, 
transitional type of its economy should be borne in mind. At present, the Russian market for consumer 
goods may properly be deemed well-established. However, it was still in the making as recently as in the 
                                                           
5 It is worth noting that this is fairly puzzling. In spite of a rather high price disparity between the Krasnodar Krai and 
Moscow, the both tests reject unit root in Model (1) at the level of better than 5%. In doing so, they use 12 lags, which 
causes suspicion of seasonality. However, eliminating seasonality, the results of testing for unit root do not 
qualitatively change.  
6 For instance, Hawaii, some parts of Alaska, and Virgin Islands in the US, the residues of former overseas 
possessions in few European countries.  
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beginning of the 2000s. Apparently, this may be an explanation of the fact that convergence of prices with 
the Moscow ones occurs in a significant number of regions, implying convergence to the spatial 
equilibrium. It is not inconceivable that price convergence has completed in a number of regions (maybe, 
even in many of them). However, Model (3) inherently characterizes dynamics of the price differential over 
the period under consideration as a whole. As the cost of staples basket was less then in Moscow (γ < 0) in 
all regions moving towards integration with the Moscow market, price convergence implies that, on 
average over 2001–2015, the cost of the basket rose faster in these regions than in Moscow.  
Perfect integration of the Moscow market with markets of a number of northern regions may seem 
strange. However, as it has been noted before, integration of the regional markets does not necessarily 
imply direct trade between them. Regional markets can interact through a chain (or, more exactly, a 
network) of other regions. The long-run path of the price differential of these regions, namely, price parity 
according to Model (1), can be explained by differences in the structure of retail prices in Moscow and the 
northern regions. Obviously, the share of transportation costs in prices for goods is much more substantial 
in these regions. At the same time, the share of the ‘nontradable component’ is high in the Moscow prices. 
The absence of statistical data on distribution costs by region makes it impossible to quantitatively assess it. 
However, indirect data can be involved. The average wage in Moscow exceeded the national average by 
the factor of 1.8–1.9 during 2011–2015 (Rosstat, 2016, p. 230). Approximately the same difference must be 
in the trade industry. As regards the lease of places of business and storage rooms, it can be judged from 
scrappy data that rents in Moscow are higher than on average in the country by the factor of 1.5–3. As a 
result, labor costs and rents increase retail prices in Moscow much greater that by 18.6% as on average in 
Russia.7 
What is really strange is the absence of integration of the Moscow market with markets of most of 
regions from Central Russia, even nearby ones. (Because of much higher share of ‘nontradable component’ 
in the Moscow prices, market integration here would have to be conditional.) Figure 5 shows time series of 
average price differential in nonintegrated regions (except for the Magadan Oblast, where the prices 
diverge from the Moscow ones); it also separately shows the time series for the Moscow Oblast. The price 
differential averaged over nonintegrated regions is similar to that averaged over all regions in Figure 3. 
This is no surprise, as the nonintegrated regions comprise two thirds of the total number of regions.  
 
                                                           
7 This is a counterpart of the Balassa–Samuelson effect, namely, a higher overall price level in rich countries because 
of more expensive (nontradable) services in these countries.  
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Fig. 5. The evolution of price differentials in nonintegrated regions  
 
There is no uniform definition of spatial market integration. The definition used here is one of a set 
of possible definitions. Theoretically, regional markets can be deemed connected (integrated to some 
extent), if demand and supply shocks arising in one region are transmitted to some degree to another region 
(Fackler and Goodwin, 2001). Judging from the graphs in Figure 5, this does not occur. Most probably, 
local processes in the Moscow market mainly determine the dynamics of the given price differentials. In 
this paper, the presence of cointegration of time series )ln( rtp  and )ln( stp  reveals the interaction of prices 
in Moscow and other regions. Models (1)–(3) are in fact cointegration relationships with predetermined 
cointegrating vector (1, – 1). Possibly, the application of different definitions of integration and respective 
analytical methodologies (e.g., Granger causality, studying impulse response functions, estimation of 
cointegrating vectors, etc.) would make it possible to find that the interaction of prices in Moscow and 
nonintegrated regions, albeit weak, does exist. However, such analyses would reveal only formal properties 
of the price interactions. Their intuitive explanation needs a ‘field survey’ of processes going in the 
Moscow market for consumer goods.       
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, regional markets for an aggregated good, namely, the staples basket, has been 
considered; the cost of this basket has played a role of price representative. The analysis has been focused 
on integration of the Moscow market with markets of other regions of Russia. The law of one price in its 
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strict and weak forms has served as the criterion of integration; long-run convergence to this law (price 
convergence) has served as the criterion of the movement towards integration. The data used cover the 
period of 2001–2015. 
It has been found that the Moscow market is very poorly integrated with markets of other regions, 
being integrated with only 20.6% of them. Along with this, a tendency to improvement in integration is 
observed: convergence to the law of one price has been revealed in 15.4% of country’s regions. A positive 
feature is the fact that there is only one case of price divergence. It occurs in the Magadan Oblast, where 
the cost of the minimum food basket was higher than in Moscow from the very beginning and rose on 
average over 2001–2015 faster than in Moscow. However, this region has poor transport accessibility, 
which makes goods arbitrage impossible. That is why the price dynamics in the Magadan Oblast is 
determined by solely local demand and supply.  
The spatial pattern of integration of the Moscow market proves to be far from the theoretically 
expected pattern. In particular, this relates to the absence of integration with nearby regions. It is 
impossible to find explanation of this phenomenon through a formal analysis. But a meaningful analysis of 
features inherent in operation of the Moscow market for consumer goods that could provide such an 
explanation, as it seems, does not exist in the literature.  
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Appendix. Full set of estimates 
 
Region Model λ  
Unit root test    
p-values 
(PP/ADF) 
γ  δ  SSR 
  1. Rep. of Karelia (1) -0.020 (0.012) 0.100 /0.100        
 (2) -0.040 (0.020) 0.282 /0.282 -0.002 (0.002)     
 (3a) -0.130 (0.036) 0.368 /0.341 -0.229*** (0.041) -0.0159*** (0.0036)  
 (3b) -0.136 (0.024) NA  -0.700*** (0.205)  0.1270*** (0.0448)  
  2. Rep. of Komi  (1) -0.031 (0.015) 0.035 /0.035        
 (2) -0.035 (0.017) 0.282 /0.282 -0.001 (0.002)     
 (3a) -0.120 (0.035) 0.051 /0.087 -0.335*** (0.102) -0.0300*** (0.0091)  
 (3b) -0.070 (0.029) 0.655 /0.580 -0.251 (0.564)  0.0437 (0.1192)  
  3. Arkhangelsk Obl. (1) -0.020 (0.011) 0.069 /0.069        
 (2) -0.023 (0.014) 0.498 /0.498 0.000 (0.002)     
 (3a) -0.114 (0.033) 0.228 /0.406 -0.387*** (0.090) -0.0241*** (0.0057)  
 (3b) -0.045 (0.026) 0.820 /0.577 -0.225 (1.097)  0.0235 (0.1543)  
  4. Vologda Obl. (1) -0.011 (0.007) 0.139 /0.139        
 (2) -0.028 (0.016) 0.386 /0.386 -0.003*** (0.002)     
 (3a) -0.096 (0.033) 0.409 /0.549 -0.293*** (0.042) -0.0099*** (0.0021)  
 (3b) -0.102 (0.031) 0.263 /0.407 -0.418*** (0.158)  0.0298* (0.0179)  
  5. Murmansk Obl. (1) -0.046 (0.023) 0.079 /0.091        
 (2) -0.057 (0.025) 0.311 /0.351 0.001 (0.001)     
 (3a) -0.059 (0.026) 0.519 /0.564 0.016 (0.037)  0.0043 (0.0171)  
 (3b) -0.045 (0.022) 0.623 /0.650 0.000 (0.002) -0.1416*** (0.0103)  
  6. St. Petersburg City (1) -0.015 (0.011) 0.153 /0.153        
 (2) -0.032 (0.020) 0.498 /0.498 -0.002 (0.002)     
 (3a) -0.141 (0.037) 0.179 /0.518 -0.197*** (0.027) -0.0119*** (0.0023)  
 (3b) -0.108 (0.022) NA  -0.570** (0.228) 0.0898** (0.0435)  
  7. Leningrad Obl. (1) -0.016 (0.009) 0.080 /0.080        
 (2) -0.030 (0.017) 0.380 /0.380 -0.002 (0.002)     
 (3a) -0.162 (0.040) 0.217 /0.633 -0.248*** (0.024) -0.0131*** (0.0017)  
 (3b) -0.133 (0.020) 0.001 /0.001 -0.831*** (0.192)  0.1219*** (0.0345)  
  8. Novgorod Obl. (1) -0.009 (0.007) 0.204 /0.205        
 (2) -0.047 (0.021) 0.311 /0.325 -0.008* (0.004)     
 (3a) -0.105 (0.034) 0.861 /0.659 -0.290*** (0.038) -0.0056*** (0.0015)  
 (3b) -0.124 (0.036) 0.616 /0.663 -0.339*** (0.052)  0.0115*** (0.0041)  
  9. Pskov Obl. (1) -0.008 (0.005) 0.134 /0.134        
 (2) -0.012 (0.012) 0.764 /0.764 -0.001 (0.003)     
 (3a) -0.135 (0.035) 0.018 /0.050 -0.398*** (0.028) -0.0098*** (0.0010) 0.0350 
 (3b) -0.100 (0.027) 0.069 /0.002 -0.583*** (0.201)  0.0303* (0.0160) 0.0354 
10. Kaliningrad Obl. (1) -0.015 (0.012) 0.188 /0.188        
 (2) -0.037 (0.020) 0.541 /0.457 -0.004 (0.003)     
 (3a) -0.054 (0.025) 0.676 /0.760 -0.620 (0.624) -0.0244* (0.0141)  
 (3b) -0.084 (0.024) 0.086 /0.553 -0.488 (0.731)  0.0435 (0.0877)  
11. Bryansk Obl. (1) -0.002 (0.003) 0.393 /0.393        
 (2) -0.043 (0.022) 0.311 /0.311 -0.013* (0.007)     
 (3a) -0.084 (0.030) 0.143 /0.143 -0.396*** (0.032) -0.0022*** (0.0008)  
 (3b) -0.089 (0.031) 0.174 /0.174 -0.410*** (0.036)  0.0031** (0.0012)  
12. Vladimir Obl. (1) -0.006 (0.005) 0.221 /0.221        
 (2) -0.033 (0.016) 0.289 /0.289 -0.006* (0.004)     
 (3a) -0.049 (0.025) 0.503 /0.503 -0.282*** (0.071) -0.0031 (0.0024)  
 (3b) -0.058 (0.027) 0.439 /0.439 -0.331*** (0.088)  0.0064 (0.0048)  
13. Ivanovo Obl. (1) -0.005 (0.005) 0.220 /0.220        
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Region Model λ  
Unit root test    
p-values 
(PP/ADF) 
γ  δ  SSR 
 (2) -0.037 (0.019) 0.335 /0.335 -0.009* (0.005)     
 (3a) -0.164 (0.041) 0.020 /0.052 -0.369*** (0.019) -0.0042*** (0.0006)  
 (3b) -0.149 (0.039) 0.084 /0.127 -0.383*** (0.027)  0.0060*** (0.0013)  
14. Kaluga Obl. (1) -0.002 (0.004) 0.513 /0.513        
 (2) -0.073 (0.028) 0.091 /0.091 -0.018** (0.007)     
 (3a) -0.077 (0.028) 0.171 /0.171 -0.231*** (0.028)  0.0008 (0.0010)  
 (3b) -0.077 (0.028) 0.225 /0.225 -0.231*** (0.026) -0.0008 (0.0009)  
15. Kostroma Obl. (1) -0.006 (0.005) 0.211 /0.211        
 (2) -0.053 (0.021) 0.144 /0.163 -0.012** (0.005)     
 (3a) -0.084 (0.031) 0.273 /0.344 -0.307*** (0.042) -0.0027** (0.0014)  
 (3b) -0.094 (0.033) 0.272 /0.342 -0.332*** (0.047)  0.0044* (0.0022)  
16. Moscow City Benchmark     
17. Moscow Obl. (1) -0.005 (0.006) 0.417 /0.421        
 (2) -0.098 (0.032) 0.130 /0.176 -0.016*** (0.005)     
 (3a) -0.106 (0.034) 0.295 /0.388 -0.175*** (0.022) -0.0009 (0.0012)  
 (3b) -0.107 (0.034) 0.340 /0.423 -0.177*** (0.024)  0.0011 (0.0015)  
18. Oryol Obl. (1) -0.004 (0.004) 0.310 /0.310        
 (2) -0.057 (0.023) 0.139 /0.139 -0.016** (0.007)     
 (3a) -0.124 (0.037) 0.245 /0.381 -0.375*** (0.025) -0.0026*** (0.0007)  
 (3b) -0.134 (0.038) 0.237 /0.379 -0.390*** (0.027)  0.0036*** (0.0011)  
19. Ryazan Obl. (1) -0.003 (0.004) 0.458 /0.458        
 (2) -0.034 (0.019) 0.373 /0.373 -0.009* (0.005)     
 (3a) -0.032 (0.019) 0.656 /0.656 -0.232** (0.095)  0.0008 (0.0030)  
 (3b) -0.032 (0.019) 0.650 /0.650 -0.226** (0.088) -0.0009 (0.0024)  
20. Smolensk Obl. (1) -0.007 (0.005) 0.202 /0.202        
 (2) -0.032 (0.017) 0.396 /0.411 -0.005 (0.003)     
 (3a) -0.083 (0.031) 0.262 /0.304 -0.296*** (0.038) -0.0056*** (0.0015)  
 (3b) -0.101 (0.033) 0.619 /0.694 -0.346*** (0.053)  0.0113*** (0.0040)  
21. Tver Obl. (1) -0.006 (0.006) 0.222 /0.222        
 (2) -0.050 (0.022) 0.296 /0.312 -0.009** (0.005)     
 (3a) -0.151 (0.040) 0.626 /0.679 -0.287*** (0.019) -0.0043*** (0.0008)  
 (3b) -0.192 (0.045) 0.341 /0.681 -0.314*** (0.020)  0.0073*** (0.0013)  
22. Tula Obl. (1) -0.003 (0.005) 0.476 /0.476        
 (2) -0.030 (0.018) 0.448 /0.448 -0.006 (0.004)     
 (3a) -0.033 (0.020) 0.668 /0.668 -0.245** (0.094) -0.0012 (0.0031)  
 (3b) -0.035 (0.021) 0.638 /0.638 -0.278** (0.117)  0.0026 (0.0048)  
23. Yaroslavl Obl. (1) -0.003 (0.005) 0.488 /0.488        
 (2) -0.054 (0.024) 0.191 /0.191 -0.012** (0.005)     
 (3a) -0.052 (0.025) 0.424 /0.424 -0.212*** (0.050)  0.0003 (0.0019)  
 (3b) -0.052 (0.025) 0.455 /0.455 -0.211*** (0.049) -0.0003 (0.0018)  
24. Rep. of Mariy El  (1) -0.002 (0.004) 0.498 /0.498        
 (2) -0.067 (0.027) 0.263 /0.298 -0.020 (0.009)     
 (3a) -0.089 (0.031) 0.242 /0.329 -0.364 (0.037) -0.0017 (0.0010)  
 (3b) -0.090 (0.031) 0.279 /0.358 -0.373 (0.041)  0.0022 (0.0014)  
25. Rep. of Mordovia (1) -0.002 (0.005) 0.564 /0.550        
 (2) -0.105 (0.033) 0.145 /0.197 -0.033** (0.010)     
 (3a) -0.125 (0.038) 0.264 /0.386 -0.342*** (0.026) -0.0010* (0.0007)  
 (3b) -0.127 (0.038) 0.305 /0.415 -0.345*** (0.027)  0.0012 (0.0009)  
              
              
26. Chuvash Rep.  (1) -0.002 (0.004) 0.509 /0.509        
 (2) -0.057 (0.025) 0.315 /0.359 -0.018** (0.008)     
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Region Model λ  
Unit root test    
p-values 
(PP/ADF) 
γ  δ  SSR 
 (3a) -0.088 (0.031) 0.242 /0.288 -0.390*** (0.036) -0.0019** (0.0009)  
 (3b) -0.090 (0.031) 0.274 /0.311 -0.399*** (0.041)  0.0025* (0.0013)  
27. Kirov Obl. (1) -0.004 (0.006) 0.423 /0.423        
 (2) -0.067 (0.026) 0.107 /0.107 -0.017** (0.007)     
 (3a) -0.079 (0.030) 0.487 /0.572 -0.297*** (0.046) -0.0013 (0.0015)  
 (3b) -0.082 (0.031) 0.492 /0.575 -0.311*** (0.051)  0.0020 (0.0020)  
28. Nizhni Novgorod Obl. (1) -0.002 (0.005) 0.518 /0.518        
 (2) -0.065 (0.027) 0.134 /0.134 -0.016** (0.007)     
 (3a) -0.078 (0.031) 0.236 /0.236 -0.279*** (0.037) -0.0013 (0.0013)  
 (3b) -0.081 (0.032) 0.412 /0.485 -0.287*** (0.040)  0.0018 (0.0016)  
29. Belgorod Obl. (1) -0.002 (0.004) 0.529 /0.522        
 (2) -0.074 (0.028) 0.169 /0.190 -0.024*** (0.009)     
 (3a) -0.076 (0.029) 0.341 /0.377 -0.339*** (0.037) -0.0003 (0.0010)  
 (3b) -0.076 (0.029) 0.381 /0.413 -0.340*** (0.037)  0.0003 (0.0010)  
30. Voronezh Obl. (1) -0.005 (0.006) 0.328 /0.328        
 (2) -0.047 (0.022) 0.268 /0.307 -0.012** (0.006)     
 (3a) -0.054 (0.025) 0.493 /0.529 -0.308*** (0.080) -0.0015 (0.0023)  
 (3b) -0.057 (0.026) 0.497 /0.526 -0.329*** (0.091)  0.0025 (0.0034)  
31. Kursk Obl. (1) -0.001 (0.004) 0.602 /0.602        
 (2) -0.043 (0.022) 0.434 /0.463 -0.015* (0.008)     
 (3a) -0.046 (0.022) 0.567 /0.606 -0.286*** (0.069)  0.0017 (0.0019)  
 (3b) -0.046 (0.022) 0.561 /0.595 -0.285*** (0.060) -0.0015 (0.0012)  
32. Lipetsk Obl. (1) -0.001 (0.004) 0.557 /0.557        
 (2) -0.059 (0.025) 0.169 /0.169 -0.020** (0.009)     
 (3a) -0.069 (0.027) 0.239 /0.239 -0.387*** (0.049) -0.0013 (0.0012)  
 (3b) -0.070 (0.028) 0.280 /0.280 -0.397*** (0.054)  0.0017 (0.0015)  
33. Tambov Obl. (1) -0.003 (0.004) 0.410 /0.381        
 (2) -0.045 (0.023) 0.557 /0.453 -0.016* (0.008)     
 (3a) -0.077 (0.029) 0.426 /0.555 -0.449*** (0.049) -0.0025** (0.0010)  
 (3b) -0.082 (0.029) 0.396 /0.537 -0.474*** (0.057)  0.0037** (0.0017)  
34. Rep. of Kalmykia  (1) -0.006 (0.007) 0.229 /0.098        
 (2) -0.052 (0.024) 0.774 /0.544 -0.015** (0.007)     
 (3a) -0.213 (0.046) 0.071 /0.820 -0.469*** (0.025) -0.0053*** (0.0007)  
 (3b) -0.229 (0.046) 0.018 /0.516 -0.506*** (0.032)  0.0089*** (0.0015)  
35. Rep. of Tatarstan  (1) -0.003 (0.004) 0.402 /0.402        
 (2) -0.076 (0.029) 0.402 /0.381 -0.025*** (0.010)     
 (3a) -0.218 (0.047) 0.016 /0.100 -0.411*** (0.014) -0.0023*** (0.0004)  
 (3b) -0.220 (0.047) 0.052 /0.145 -0.417*** (0.016)  0.0028*** (0.0005)  
36. Astrakhan Obl. (1) -0.006 (0.008) 0.501 /0.346        
 (2) -0.094 (0.032) 0.559 /0.609 -0.023*** (0.008)     
 (3a) -0.159 (0.040) 0.184 /0.736 -0.336*** (0.030) -0.0033*** (0.0010)  
 (3b) -0.167 (0.040) 0.178 /0.656 -0.355*** (0.036)  0.0050*** (0.0017)  
37. Volgograd Obl. (1) -0.003 (0.006) 0.538 /0.557        
 (2) -0.081 (0.030) 0.162 /0.182 -0.022*** (0.008)     
 (3a) -0.103 (0.032) 0.143 /0.151 -0.332*** (0.039) -0.0022* (0.0011)  
 (3b) -0.105 (0.032) 0.185 /0.190 -0.346*** (0.045)  0.0031* (0.0018)  
              
              
              
38. Penza Obl. (1) -0.001 (0.004) 0.582 /0.582        
 (2) -0.043 (0.022) 0.307 /0.307 -0.014* (0.007)     
 (3a) -0.044 (0.023) 0.537 /0.537 -0.328*** (0.069) -0.0003 (0.0017)  
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Region Model λ  
Unit root test    
p-values 
(PP/ADF) 
γ  δ  SSR 
 (3b) -0.045 (0.024) 0.548 /0.548 -0.331*** (0.070)  0.0004 (0.0019)  
39. Samara Obl. (1) -0.006 (0.008) 0.388 /0.388        
 (2) -0.107 (0.034) 0.042 /0.057 -0.017*** (0.006)     
 (3a) -0.108 (0.034) 0.107 /0.138 -0.157*** (0.027)  0.0003 (0.0015)  
 (3b) -0.108 (0.034) 0.164 /0.195 -0.157*** (0.026) -0.0003 (0.0014)  
40. Saratov Obl (1) 0.001 (0.004) 0.718 /0.728        
. (2) -0.063 (0.024) 0.092 /0.092 -0.021*** (0.008)     
 (3a) -0.100 (0.032) 0.074 /0.074 -0.281*** (0.023)  0.0016** (0.0007) 0.0411 
 (3b) -0.102 (0.032) 0.123 /0.123 -0.282*** (0.020) -0.0014*** (0.0005) 0.0411 
41. Ulyanovsk Obl. (1) -0.001 (0.004) 0.533 /0.533        
 (2) -0.076 (0.029) 0.086 /0.086 -0.024*** (0.009)     
 (3a) -0.124 (0.036) 0.036 /0.036 -0.363*** (0.020) -0.0015*** (0.0005) 0.0377 
 (3b) -0.128 (0.037) 0.078 /0.078 -0.369*** (0.022)  0.0019*** (0.0007) 0.0376 
42. Rep. of Adygeya  (1) -0.006 (0.007) 0.359 /0.359        
 (2) -0.081 (0.030) 0.770 /0.309 -0.020*** (0.008)     
 (3a) -0.143 (0.038) 0.372 /0.628 -0.342*** (0.032) -0.0035*** (0.0010)  
 (3b) -0.161 (0.040) 0.169 /0.561 -0.374*** (0.037)  0.0059*** (0.0019)  
43. Rep. of Dagestan (1) -0.008 (0.007) 0.125 /0.073        
 (2) -0.062 (0.027) 0.858 /0.588 -0.015** (0.007)     
 (3a) -0.245 (0.049) 0.005 /0.828 -0.388*** (0.019) -0.0050*** (0.0006)  
 (3b) -0.248 (0.048) 0.017 /0.619 -0.412*** (0.025)  0.0078*** (0.0014)  
44. Rep. of Ingushetia (1) -0.012 (0.012) 0.280 /0.280        
 (2) -0.120 (0.035) 0.012 /0.012 -0.021*** (0.006)     
 (3a) -0.124 (0.036) 0.037 /0.037 -0.155*** (0.035)  0.0010 (0.0020)  
 (3b) -0.125 (0.037) 0.087 /0.087 -0.153*** (0.032) -0.0010 (0.0015)  
45. Kabardian-Balkar Rep.  (1) -0.005 (0.007) 0.439 /0.413        
 (2) -0.170 (0.042) 0.138 /0.502 -0.051*** (0.013)     
 (3a) -0.269 (0.052) 0.019 /0.940 -0.360*** (0.017) -0.0019*** (0.0005)  
 (3b) -0.276 (0.052) 0.062 /0.840 -0.366*** (0.018)  0.0025*** (0.0007)  
46. Karachaev-Cirkassian Rep. (1) -0.006 (0.006) 0.332 /0.314        
 (2) -0.075 (0.029) 0.189 /0.199 -0.020** (0.008)     
 (3a) -0.203 (0.045) 0.151 /0.829 -0.374*** (0.021) -0.0036*** (0.0006)  
 (3b) -0.217 (0.046) 0.126 /0.703 -0.392*** (0.024)  0.0053*** (0.0011)  
47. Rep. of Northern Ossetia  (1) -0.006 (0.007) 0.400 /0.195        
 (2) -0.094 (0.032) 0.613 /0.531 -0.025*** (0.009)     
 (3a) -0.218 (0.046) 0.072 /0.904 -0.372*** (0.022) -0.0035*** (0.0006)  
 (3b) -0.236 (0.048) 0.041 /0.818 -0.392*** (0.025)  0.0053*** (0.0011)  
48. Krasnodar Krai (1) -0.012 (0.008) 0.003 /0.037        
 (2) -0.084 (0.029) 0.206 /0.501 -0.017*** (0.006)     
 (3a) -0.341 (0.057) 0.000 /0.816 -0.326*** (0.012) -0.0051*** (0.0005)  
 (3b) -0.394 (0.060) 0.002 /0.669 -0.350*** (0.014)  0.0083*** (0.0009)  
49. Stavropol Krai (1) -0.006 (0.006) 0.337 /0.337        
 (2) -0.054 (0.023) 0.172 /0.172 -0.013** (0.006)     
 (3a) -0.082 (0.031) 0.923 /0.790 -0.325*** (0.052) -0.0031* (0.0016)  
 (3b) -0.092 (0.032) 0.815 /0.719 -0.365*** (0.063)  0.0058* (0.0031)  
              
              
              
50. Rostov Obl. (1) -0.006 (0.006) 0.110 /0.102       0.0974 
 (2) -0.061 (0.025) 0.468 /0.288 -0.016** (0.007)    0.0946 
 (3a) -0.121 (0.037) 0.867 /0.733 -0.373*** (0.037) -0.0036*** (0.0011) 0.0921 
 (3b) -0.143 (0.039) 0.695 /0.637 -0.411*** (0.041)  0.0064*** (0.0019) 0.0910 
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Region Model λ  
Unit root test    
p-values 
(PP/ADF) 
γ  δ  SSR 
51. Rep. of Bashkortostan  (1) -0.002 (0.005) 0.495 /0.495        
 (2) -0.067 (0.027) 0.269 /0.325 -0.019** (0.008)     
 (3a) -0.143 (0.037) 0.019 /0.027 -0.363*** (0.022) -0.0026*** (0.0006) 0.0530 
 (3b) -0.144 (0.037) 0.060 /0.067 -0.372*** (0.026)  0.0034*** (0.0010) 0.0529 
52. Udmurt Rep.  (1) -0.002 (0.005) 0.530 /0.530        
 (2) -0.143 (0.039) 0.023 /0.059 -0.041*** (0.011)     
 (3a) -0.178 (0.042) 0.012 /0.032 -0.326*** (0.019) -0.0013** (0.0006) 0.0721 
 (3b) -0.178 (0.042) 0.051 /0.081 -0.327*** (0.020)  0.0014* (0.0007) 0.0721 
53. Kurgan Obl. (1) -0.004 (0.005) 0.455 /0.426        
 (2) -0.057 (0.026) 0.402 /0.439 -0.015** (0.007)     
 (3a) -0.167 (0.039) 0.008 /0.019 -0.379*** (0.023) -0.0037*** (0.0007) 0.0679 
 (3b) -0.172 (0.039) 0.037 /0.050 -0.397*** (0.028)  0.0055*** (0.0013) 0.0674 
54. Orenburg Obl. (1) -0.001 (0.004) 0.603 /0.603       0.0567 
 (2) -0.133 (0.036) 0.006 /0.006 -0.042*** (0.011)    0.0527 
 (3a) -0.144 (0.037) 0.010 /0.010 -0.337*** (0.020) -0.0008 (0.0006) 0.0521 
 (3b) -0.145 (0.037) 0.047 /0.047 -0.338*** (0.021)  0.0009 (0.0007) 0.0521 
55. Perm Krai (1) -0.004 (0.006) 0.433 /0.433        
 (2) -0.044 (0.022) 0.284 /0.284 -0.009* (0.005)     
 (3a) -0.066 (0.027) 0.253 /0.253 -0.297*** (0.060) -0.0038* (0.0020)  
 (3b) -0.070 (0.027) 0.265 /0.265 -0.338*** (0.090)  0.0071 (0.0050)  
56. Sverdlovsk Obl. (1) -0.009 (0.009) 0.281 /0.281        
 (2) -0.040 (0.021) 0.328 /0.328 -0.005 (0.003)     
 (3a) -0.083 (0.029) 0.230 /0.252 -0.271*** (0.057) -0.0081*** (0.0027)  
 (3b) -0.094 (0.017) 0.004 /0.022 -1.050*** (0.259)  0.0925*** (0.0285)  
57. Chelyabinsk Obl. (1) -0.005 (0.008) 0.434 /0.434        
 (2) -0.087 (0.031) 0.107 /0.137 -0.018*** (0.006)     
 (3a) -0.132 (0.036) 0.037 /0.041 -0.268*** (0.029) -0.0032*** (0.0011) 0.0736 
 (3b) -0.134 (0.036) 0.080 /0.081 -0.282*** (0.036)  0.0046** (0.0021) 0.0733 
58. Rep. of Altai (1) -0.014 (0.012) 0.308 /0.262        
 (2) -0.064 (0.027) 0.496 /0.551 -0.010** (0.005)     
 (3a) -0.274 (0.047) 0.000 /0.000 -0.334*** (0.023) -0.0088*** (0.0010) 0.1281 
 (3b) -0.238 (0.044) 0.013 /0.021 -0.383*** (0.046)  0.0181*** (0.0045) 0.1302 
59. Altai Krai (1) -0.004 (0.006) 0.433 /0.433        
 (2) -0.045 (0.022) 0.497 /0.521 -0.012* (0.007)     
 (3a) -0.135 (0.036) 0.051 /0.172 -0.441*** (0.038) -0.0052*** (0.0010)  
 (3b) -0.151 (0.036) 0.058 /0.113 -0.491*** (0.050)  0.0094*** (0.0024)  
60. Kemerovo Obl. (1) -0.004 (0.007) 0.555 /0.539        
 (2) -0.114 (0.035) 0.097 /0.158 -0.029*** (0.009)     
 (3a) -0.176 (0.042) 0.023 /0.063 -0.314*** (0.023) -0.0025*** (0.0008) 0.0927 
 (3b) -0.183 (0.042) 0.058 /0.097 -0.326*** (0.026)  0.0035*** (0.0012) 0.0922 
61. Novosibirsk Obl. (1) -0.012 (0.010) 0.247 /0.251        
 (2) -0.035 (0.020) 0.574 /0.593 -0.004 (0.003)     
 (3a) -0.138 (0.036) 0.032 /0.036 -0.356*** (0.045) -0.0115*** (0.0020) 0.0817 
 (3b) -0.127 (0.018) 0.000 /0.039 -1.333*** (0.287)  0.1233*** (0.0327) 0.0807 
              
              
              
62. Omsk Obl. (1) -0.001 (0.005) 0.603 /0.603        
 (2) -0.071 (0.027) 0.159 /0.219 -0.024*** (0.009)     
 (3a) -0.086 (0.029) 0.173 /0.258 -0.388*** (0.042) -0.0016 (0.0010)  
 (3b) -0.088 (0.029) 0.215 /0.291 -0.402*** (0.048) 0.0022 (0.0015)  
63. Tomsk Obl. (1) -0.008 (0.008) 0.312 /0.271        
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Region Model λ  
Unit root test    
p-values 
(PP/ADF) 
γ  δ  SSR 
 (2) -0.050 (0.023) 0.400 /0.394 -0.009* (0.005)     
 (3a) -0.113 (0.035) 0.156 /0.249 -0.315*** (0.042) -0.0063*** (0.0016)  
 (3b) -0.139 (0.037) 0.095 /0.142 -0.389*** (0.062)  0.0149*** (0.0051)  
64. Tyumen Obl. (1) -0.135 (0.038) 0.048 /0.156        
 (2) -0.158 (0.041) 0.207 /0.504 0.003 (0.002)     
 (3a) -0.165 (0.042) 0.008 /0.008 0.010 (0.016)  0.0059 (0.0117)  
 (3b) -0.163 (0.041) 0.042 /0.064 0.013 (0.015) -0.0028 (0.0054)  
65. Rep. of Buryatia (1) -0.011 (0.011) 0.398 /0.353        
 (2) -0.098 (0.032) 0.130 /0.177 -0.015*** (0.005)     
 (3a) -0.127 (0.036) 0.104 /0.210 -0.221*** (0.038) -0.0041** (0.0019)  
 (3b) -0.136 (0.037) 0.119 /0.211 -0.270*** (0.056)  0.0096* (0.0051)  
66. Rep. of Tuva  (1) -0.018 (0.014) 0.201 /0.201        
 (2) -0.084 (0.030) 0.159 /0.215 -0.009** (0.004)     
 (3a) -0.178 (0.041) 0.037 /0.501 -0.223*** (0.030) -0.0085*** (0.0019)  
 (3b) -0.174 (0.040) 0.082 /0.369 -0.260*** (0.057)  0.0180** (0.0081)  
67. Rep. of Khakasia  (1) -0.011 (0.012) 0.416 /0.380        
 (2) -0.106 (0.033) 0.377 /0.565 -0.016*** (0.005)     
 (3a) -0.150 (0.038) 0.194 /0.857 -0.227*** (0.033) -0.0048*** (0.0017)  
 (3b) -0.161 (0.039) 0.140 /0.806 -0.269*** (0.049) 0.0104** (0.0046)  
68. Krasnoyarsk Krai (1) -0.032 (0.019) 0.198 /0.190        
 (2) -0.170 (0.042) 0.205 /0.531 -0.014*** (0.004)     
 (3a) -0.285 (0.051) 0.002 /0.253 -0.144*** (0.016) -0.0064*** (0.0014)  
 (3b) -0.283 (0.051) 0.026 /0.233 -0.155*** (0.022)  0.0109*** (0.0040)  
69. Irkutsk Obl. (1) -0.021 (0.016) 0.344 /0.355        
 (2) -0.102 (0.033) 0.137 /0.193 -0.011*** (0.004)     
 (3a) -0.152 (0.038) 0.039 /0.055 -0.192*** (0.035) -0.0075*** (0.0024) 0.0957 
 (3b) -0.157 (0.038) 0.080 /0.094 -0.227*** (0.061)  0.0160* (0.0091) 0.0950 
70. Transbaikal Krai (1) -0.027 (0.017) 0.104 /0.104        
 (2) -0.102 (0.034) 0.423 /0.392 -0.010** (0.004)     
 (3a) -0.206 (0.044) 0.001 /0.001 -0.211*** (0.029) -0.0093*** (0.0021) 0.1111 
 (3b) -0.207 (0.044) 0.017 /0.017 -0.254*** (0.054)  0.0213** (0.0092) 0.1104 
71. Rep. of Sakha (Yakutia)  (1) -0.002 (0.008) 0.606 /0.606        
 (2) -0.052 (0.025) 0.247 /0.247 0.013** (0.006)     
 (3a) -0.091 (0.031) 0.119 /0.119 0.159*** (0.037)  0.0041** (0.0018)  
 (3b) -0.086 (0.031) 0.198 /0.198 0.173*** (0.033) -0.0027*** (0.0008)  
72. Jewish Autonomous Obl. (1) -0.033 (0.019) 0.070 /0.070        
 (2) -0.034 (0.019) 0.361 /0.361 0.001 (0.002)     
 (3a) -0.039 (0.021) 0.558 /0.558 0.012 (0.055)  0.0094 (0.0301)  
 (3b) -0.037 (0.020) 0.570 /0.570 0.019 (0.057) -0.0036 (0.0074)  
73. Chukotka A.O. (1) -0.003 (0.004) 0.424 /0.424        
 (2) -0.090 (0.032) 0.060 /0.060 0.074*** (0.027)     
 (3a) -0.099 (0.033) 0.100 /0.100 0.902*** (0.085) -0.0009 (0.0009)  
 (3b) -0.098 (0.033) 0.161 /0.161 0.898*** (0.089)  0.0009 (0.0010)  
              
              
              
74. Primorsky Krai (1) -0.013 (0.014) 0.315 /0.329        
 (2) -0.029 (0.018) 0.469 /0.462 0.003 (0.002)     
 (3a) -0.050 (0.024) 0.900 /0.928 0.035 (0.041)  0.0097 (0.0075)  
 (3b) -0.043 (0.022) 0.882 /0.047 0.056 (0.042) -0.0039*** (0.0015)  
75. Khabarovsk Krai (1) -0.008 (0.013) 0.460 /0.460        
 (2) -0.025 (0.017) 0.558 /0.558 0.003 (0.002)     
 26
Region Model λ  
Unit root test    
p-values 
(PP/ADF) 
γ  δ  SSR 
 (3a) -0.057 (0.025) 0.336 /0.336 0.030 (0.028)  0.0113* (0.0061)  
 (3b) -0.048 (0.023) 0.452 /0.452 0.053* (0.030) -0.0043*** (0.0009)  
76. Amur Obl. (1) -0.028 (0.015) 0.068 /0.068        
 (2) -0.029 (0.017) 0.434 /0.434  0.000 (0.002)     
 (3a) -0.119 (0.034) 0.029 /0.029 -0.504** (0.194) -0.0358*** (0.0114)  
 (3b) -0.045 (0.028) 0.531 /0.546 -0.155 1.739)  0.0213 (0.3377)  
77. Kamchatka Krai (1) -0.003 (0.007) 0.530 /0.550        
 (2) -0.108 (0.032) 0.151 /0.549 0.037*** (0.011)     
 (3a) -0.107 (0.032) 0.370 /0.801 0.366*** (0.051) -0.0005 (0.0013)  
 (3b) -0.107 (0.033) 0.413 /0.775 0.365*** (0.052)  0.0005 (0.0014)  
78. Magadan Obl. (1) -0.001 (0.005) 0.647 /0.586        
 (2) -0.041 (0.022) 0.414 /0.432 0.014* (0.008)     
 (3a) -0.108 (0.033) 0.054 /0.054 0.233*** (0.029)  0.0038*** (0.0010)  
 (3b) -0.099 (0.032) 0.138 /0.138 0.252*** (0.028) -0.0025*** (0.0005)  
79. Sakhalin Obl. (1) -0.005 (0.008) 0.439 /0.439        
 (2) -0.035 (0.020) 0.382 /0.382 0.009** (0.005)     
 (3a) -0.043 (0.023) 0.541 /0.541 0.183** (0.091) 0.0024 (0.0038)  
 (3b) -0.041 (0.022) 0.572 /0.572 0.198* (0.089) -0.0015 (0.0026)  
Notes: 1. PP and ADF stand for the Phillips-Perron test and augmented Dickey-Fuller test, respectively. 2. Standard 
errors are in parenthesis. 3. Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). 4. SSR = sum of squared residuals. 5. Chosen 
model specifications (under both ‘specific-to-general’ and ‘general-to-specific’ approaches) are marked with bold font. 
6. NA means that the nonlinear OLS algorithm has failed in estimating auxiliary regressions while testing for unit root. 
7. ‘Obl.’ = Oblast, ‘Rep.’ = Republic, and ‘A.O.’ = Autonomous Okrug. 
 
